

31.8.2017

## SUMMARY: PREPAREDNESS FOR AND PREVENTION OF TERRORISM

### 1 Introduction

This summary is based on the proposals commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior from the National Police Board and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, and on a confidential memorandum concerning the impact of terrorist acts on preparedness in Finland which is being drafted at the Ministry of the Interior. In line with the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the summary is divided into sections: preventing terrorism, detecting terrorism, combating terrorist activities, and preparedness and consequence management. In preparation of this summary, measures resulting from the suspected terrorist attack in Turku on 18 August 2017 were taken into account to the extent possible at that moment.

### 2 Assessment of the most serious threats

Terrorist attacks focus on 'soft targets' and the methods used aim to cause as many casualties as possible. The threat posed by terrorism has increased in Finland. So far the risk of violence perpetrated by domestic extremist movements has been low.

If the threat level set by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service were raised to 'high' or 'severe', it would have wide-ranging impacts on daily work of the police. Raising the threat level would mean a stronger focus on daily work and a significant increase in costs. A stronger focus on daily work would mean that there would be a delay in fulfilling some of the statutory duties of the police and there would be a risk that those duties could not be fulfilled at all. This would, in turn, mean that there would be a need to prepare for providing information on the change in the focus of the police operations and on the reduced availability of some of the police services.

Effective preparedness means not only an increase in the number of police patrols, but also training them and providing them with modern and high-performing equipment. In addition, there should be effective police patrols evenly across the country, but the focus should be on big cities because they have more potential targets.

Hybrid influencing is a verified threat. It is directed particularly at the interfaces of different authorities' responsibilities and powers. Hybrid influencing also seeks to make use of the asylum seeker situation. This highlights the significance of national and international cooperation. The traditional line between internal and external security is no longer sensible.

### 3 Practical measures already implemented

#### 3.1. Finnish Security Intelligence Service — information gathering

Information gathering has been made more effective across the country, for example by allocating new resources to regional offices of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

The number of employees gathering information has been increased.

Secret intelligence gathering methods have been used increasingly in recent years.

International cooperation has been intensified through more extensive liaison officer activities and increased exchange of information.

The latest example of this is the posting of a public official of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to the Netherlands to work at a counter-terrorism situation centre.

### **Finnish Security Intelligence Service — processing of information**

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has made changes to its organisation to support its operational duties. As part of this reorganisation, the Service established a new unit, tasked with improving the use, screening and sharing of tip-offs and other information.

A clear process has been introduced for the assessing and processing of counter-terrorism target individuals which emphasises cooperation between authorities.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has targeted recruitment systematically at people with special expertise to support the processes for processing and analysing information.

### **Finnish Security Intelligence Service — sharing of information**

A new method to disclose operational information for the use of competent authorities has been adopted. For example, information on counter-terrorism target individuals is submitted regularly to the National Bureau of Investigation and local police departments. The information disclosed has been referred to competent authorities for considering whether the information is sufficient for launching a criminal investigation.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has trained both national security authorities and other key actors and provided them with reports on situation awareness on terrorism. At the same, it has built up a more extensive partnership network.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has seconded a liaison officer to a unit of the National Bureau of Investigation which deals with such matters as facilitation of illegal immigration, intelligence, analysis and threat assessment.

The section on terrorism in the reports submitted to state leaders and the police has increased significantly and new resources have been allocated for its drafting. About 70 per cent of the reports submitted last year dealt with terrorism or the threat posed by terrorism.

## **3.2. National Police Board**

The capability and response of the police to handle terrorist attacks and other demanding special situations have been systematically developed over the years.

In light of the current threat level, the basic response of the police is at a good level.

All police officers have been trained in tactical operating procedures for stopping armed attacks.

In February 2017, the National Police Board issued instructions on how the police units cooperate in dealing with persons who present a terrorist threat or a risk of violent extremism (the instructions are not public).

Police presence in public places and large public events has been increased.

The police have acquired specialist equipment to combat terrorism.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has around 350 counter-terrorism target individuals who are to a large extent also targets of criminal intelligence or investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation and the local police.

In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation has identified — working with a variety of other actors — almost an equal number of other targets.

On the basis of the risk assessment made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the police prioritise, if possible, those who have been issued with a return decision and profiled as high-risk individuals in terms of internal security.

The National Bureau of Investigation screens high-risk individuals among all asylum seekers.

In February 2017, the National Police Board drew up a plan to enhance the enforcement of returns of persons whose application for asylum has been rejected. This plan is being resolutely implemented.

Detention facilities have been expanded.

The Cybercrime Centre has been established in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The multi-professional early intervention model — Anchor model — operates at all police departments.

All police personnel have received training in the identification and prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism.

The police have taken part in various projects at local and national level, such as the RADINET (exit) service and the 'Reach Out' action.

Under the direction of the Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency, the Vantaa prison is presently implementing a project aimed at developing methods for identifying radicalisation in prison.

Finland is actively involved in international efforts to combat terrorism and extremism (Radicalisation Awareness Network, operational activities and exchange of information: Europol, Interpol, bilateral and multilateral cooperation).

The police cooperate in local networks and are involved in new structures based on multi-professional cooperation (e.g. the national 'Threats' utility).

### 3.3. Ministry of the Interior

Particular attention is paid to combating terrorism (freezing terrorist funds) in the prevention of money laundering.

Precautionary measures under the Aliens Act.

Ensuring the enforcement of removal decisions. A foreign national may be detained if, taking account of his or her personal and other circumstances, there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she will pose a threat to national security.

Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code lays down provisions on terrorist offences; the most recent provisions criminalise training for the commission of a terrorist offence and travel with intent to commit a terrorist offence. The funding of such travel is punishable as terrorist financing (Ministry of Justice).

The new Directive on combating terrorism was adopted on 15 March 2017. Member States are obliged to criminalise, as new offences, the receipt of training for terrorism, travel for the purpose of terrorism, facilitation of such travel and terrorist financing.

Government Resolution on a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2014) and interim report (2016). The Strategy is being revised.

Finland's first National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was published in 2012, the second one in 2016. A progress report is currently being prepared on the implementation of the Action Plan and its new initiatives.

The police have stepped up their efforts to combat hate speech and to improve online policing. Hate speech is a central channel for spreading propaganda and creating confrontations between population groups, which is the strategic objective of ISIL.

Measures have been taken to prepare for returning foreign fighters, and an operating model for cross-sectoral cooperation prepared to make it easier to deal with returnees.

The Police, Customs and the Border Guard have, for several years now, had the right to obtain the necessary passenger information.

Public authorities have received extensive training: all local police departments, the multiprofessional Anchor (Ankkuri) teams and the authorities in the education sector have been trained; local training sessions.

The Anchor model has been expanded.

The RADINET (exit) service, which is a national exit model for people who want to renounce violent extremism and violence, has been expanded. The current resources do not meet the number of customers.

Finland takes part in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and the Coalition working group on foreign terrorist fighters. At the working group's meeting in July 2017, Finland gave a presentation on its operating model for dealing with returning foreign fighters.

The EU Internal Security Strategy sets the fight against terrorism as one of the three priority areas, and combating violent radicalisation is also one of the cornerstones of the fight against terrorism within the EU. Finland has consistently supported the work carried out in the EU. An efficient and high-quality exchange of information, with due respect for data security and fundamental rights, plays a key role in international cooperation.

Measures have been taken, under the coordination of the Commission, to explore ways of improving information exchange, and a Commission high-level working group will start its work in autumn 2017, with the aim of strengthening the fight against violent extremism in the EU.

The Schengen Borders Code has been amended, which makes it possible to carry out systematic border checks also on EU nationals at the external borders. In addition, new EU legislation is being prepared to create the EU Entry/Exit system and the ETIAS system.

European security services, including Finland, have enhanced cooperation in combating terrorism.

Finland considers it essential to pay even more attention to the role of the internet and social media in radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. Public authorities can make use of the internet and social media, for example, by establishing contacts with citizens and detecting 'weak signals'. Finland is already doing all this at national level. Because the internet has no borders, it is vital for the authorities to engage in international cooperation to reduce access to radicalising terrorist material online.

## **4 What still needs to be done?**

### **4.1. Measures to prevent terrorism**

Updating the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Continuing the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism and securing sufficient resources under the coordination of the Ministry of the Interior.

Providing public authorities and representatives of the relevant organisations with consistent training in the identification of violent radicalisation and preventive action.

Implementing the Proposal for Arranging Cross-sectoral Cooperation on Managing Returnees from Conflict Zones, adopted by the ministerial working group on internal security and administration of justice on 29 March 2017.

Preventing radicalisation in prisons by further developing the EXIT action.

Continuing the development of the EXIT action to enable efficient intervention in violent radicalisation through measures other than criminal law measures, such as services provided by municipalities and organisations. Improving the coordination of the EXIT action and referral to services.

Making more efficient use of the Anchor model.

Assigning police trainers to international duties.

Training the personnel of the Finnish Immigration Service.

Strengthening critical infrastructure and the protection of soft targets in the Ministry of the Interior's administrative branch.

In addition to the actions that fall under the responsibility of public authorities, it is important to secure the provision of other existing services, which is why the RADINET (exit) service needs to be enhanced.

Increasing well-researched information on such issues as: 1) What kind of terrorist propaganda and other material are targeted against Finland on the internet? 2) The emerging of the radical Islamist environment in Finland.

#### **4.2. Measures to detect terrorism (non-public details)**

Improving the operational capability of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

Further developing information systems to better meet the requirements of the operating environment and the possibilities of information technology.

Assessing and improving the analysis function of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and the National Bureau of Investigation, and the process used by the entire police force for tip-offs concerning different terrorist or violent threats.

#### **4.3. Measures to prevent terrorism (non-public details)**

Enhancing the process concerning counter-terrorism target individuals.

Ensuring the distribution of reports by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service within the police administration.

Improving the capacity to prevent cybercrime.

Improving the operational capacity of the Police Information Services Centre.

#### **4.4. Measures to manage incidents and emergencies (non-public details)**

Increasing the current number of police patrols — improving the first response of the police by strengthening the operational capability and regional coverage.

Improving the operational capability of the police by purchasing the necessary equipment.

Improving the information and communication technology capabilities of the police.

Ensuring that the police's operational capability is utilised evenly — personnel planning, long-term purchases of equipment covering more than one budget year.

Ensuring the police's operational capability related to communications.

Exercises before the upcoming EU Presidency — focus on strategic and operative management, field operations, operational command and communications systems and backup systems, communications with citizens.

Ensuring the strategic communications capacity.

Ensuring operational command and communication channels.

Improving the security of maritime traffic.

Further developing the system for sending and receiving classified information (protection or security classifications up to level II) particularly in view of electronic documents.

Security solutions in the police premises — the main police stations are critical targets in terms of operational activities and related support activities.

#### 4.5. Legislative means

Rapid preparation of intelligence legislation.

Implementation of the Directive on combating terrorism.

Aliens Act, Nationality Act and returns; cancellation of residence permits, entry bans, losing Finnish citizenship, ending refugee status.

Fight against illegal immigration, and returns; more effective investigation of violations of the Aliens Act, taking possession of travel documents during the asylum process, imposition of entry bans and cancellation of residence permits, effective readmission agreements.

Act on the Openness of Government Activities; in the Act, State security is used as grounds for secrecy, but it should also cover secrecy relating to threats of national security.

Police Act; the Act should include a search and seizure which would enable detection and prevention of terrorist offences, but the search and seizure could be reported retrospectively.

Review of provisions on the use of force in the Police Act and review of certain provisions in the Public Servants Act.

Provisions on executive assistance; speeding up the decision-making process of executive assistance, particularly in respect of military force; right of the Border Guard to give executive assistance that includes the use of military force also on land for the purpose of combating terrorism; expanding executive assistance that includes the use of military force to prevent and stop also other serious offences than those committed with terrorist intent.

Act on the Processing of Personal Data by the Police; the Act should be reformed to respond to the key needs of intelligence, criminal intelligence, crime combating and analysis caused by changes in the operating environment.

Reserve police; plans to use under normal and emergency conditions. The reserve police would be used to support the actual police activities.

#### 4.6. Resources

The proposed measures to prepare for terrorist acts in Finland call for assessment of the resources of both the police and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. The proposal includes not only those counter-terrorism measures which have been planned in the long term, but also the new assessments of the sufficiency of resources and operating procedures that were made after the events in Turku. In addition to human resources, police equipment must be modern and high-performing, and efforts should be focussed on information gathering and cyber capability.