Frequently asked questions about criminal intelligence legislation

One of the key objectives of the Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo’s Government is to step up the combating of crime to improve people’s safety and security and trust in the authorities. Legislation evolves to respond to changes in the security environment, such as the development of organised crime and the various forms of associated serious crime.

Criminal intelligence methods are essential, particularly in combating serious crime. This includes, for example, serious drug-related crime and its associated phenomena, various hybrid threats to internal security that manifest themselves as criminal activity, and threats that pose a serious risk to the life or health of large numbers of people.

As the operating environment changes, the threats posed by crime have become more serious, more diverse and more rapidly developing, and should therefore be proactively prevented. This requires intelligence collection to be started at an earlier stage than is currently the case. 

New criminal intelligence provisions for the police would enable more effective intervention in, among other things, serious gang crime and organised crime. Better and more comprehensive intelligence will result in better decisions and greater effectiveness.

The aim of criminal intelligence is to prevent threats posed by crime that seriously threaten the safety and security of an individual or society from materialising into serious crime.

More information about the Ministry of the Interior legislative project: https://intermin.fi/hankkeet/hankesivu?tunnus=SM047:00/2023 and https://intermin.fi/hankkeet/hankesivu?tunnus=SM033:00/2025 (in Finnish)

Criminal intelligence is the collection of information on crime and criminal offences and the analysis of the collected information for the purpose of combating crime. Intelligence generates information that enables the authorities to influence and prepare for threats, risks, opportunities and changes.

Police criminal intelligence is linked to preventing crime, forming an analysed situational picture of crime and collecting early-stage information to obtain a complete overview.  

Threat-informed criminal intelligence is criminal intelligence in which intelligence collection and analysis is directed at detecting and combating threats posed by crime, not just individual crimes.

The main target of threat-informed criminal intelligence would be organised crime. Serious crime includes drug crime, violent crime, money laundering crime, human trafficking crime and crimes against children.

Threat-informed criminal intelligence would be carried out using the secret intelligence collection methods already in use to prevent crime. The new regulations would enable secret intelligence collection at an earlier stage than at present, i.e. before a criminal project has progressed to a concrete and identified offence. 

Threat-informed criminal intelligence would be carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation, one of whose tasks is to combat international, organised, professional, financial and other serious crime. 

Secret intelligence collection methods include surveillance, covert intelligence collection, technical observation and technical tracking. The methods are already in the Police Act, but now they could be used under different conditions.

Under the new provisions, the police could also collect location data of a person or object and data identifying a network address or terminal equipment, and conduct undercover activities and make pseudo purchases. Controlled delivery, controlled use of covert human intelligence sources and the use of participatory covert human intelligence sources would also be included in the police toolkit.

If the Constitution is amended, threat-informed criminal intelligence could include, for example, so-called coercive telecommunications measures (telecommunications interception, collecting data other than through telecommunications interception, traffic data monitoring and collecting subscriber data), on-site interception, technical surveillance of a device, and site exploitation. 

Criminal intelligence targets organised crime that seriously threatens the safety and security of an individual or society, as well as threats of serious crime that are widely directed at critical infrastructure, the life or health of large numbers of people, the environment, the fundamental functions of the rule of law, or public order and security.

Criminal intelligence may be targeted at a person who, based on the person’s statements, threats, behaviour or circumstances, may be presumed to be participating in activities that seriously threaten the safety and security of an individual or society. 

In practice, criminal intelligence would be targeted at persons operating and moving in criminal circles, belonging to criminal organisations or participating in ongoing criminal projects. If a specific person cannot be identified, certain criminal intelligence methods may be targeted at a group of people.

As a last resort, criminal intelligence could also be directed at another person if it is not possible to target the person or group of people involved in the threatening activity and, based on the person’s statements, threats, behaviour or specific circumstances, there are very strong grounds to believe that the use of the criminal intelligence method will provide important information about activity that poses a serious threat to the safety and security of an individual or society.

Intelligence collection would not be targeted, however, at people who inadvertently become aware of criminal projects, for example.

The first legislative proposal, which is to be submitted to Parliament as soon as possible, sets out those provisions on threat-informed criminal intelligence that are considered possible within the framework of the current Constitution.

The aim has been to keep interference with the protection of fundamental rights to the minimum possible, taking into account the requirements set for the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal intelligence.

Section 10 of the Constitution provides for the protection of confidential communications and domestic privacy, which may be restricted by law only within the framework of express grounds (qualified limitation clauses) laid down in the Constitution. Current provisions do not allow for the threat-informed restriction of these fundamental rights in order to combat serious crime. 

If the legislative proposal to amend the Constitution currently before Parliament (HE 50/2026 vp) is adopted, it would also be possible to provide in the Police Act for threat-informed criminal intelligence methods that target confidential communications and the core of the protection of domestic peace. 

The draft proposal, which will be circulated for comments from 8 June to 3 August 2026, would include a chapter on threat-informed criminal intelligence in the form in which it could be enacted as a result of the amendments to the Constitution.  In such a case, threat-informed criminal intelligence could also use telecommunications interception, collecting data other than through telecommunications interception, traffic data monitoring, collecting subscriber data, on-site interception, technical surveillance of a device, and site exploitation, as well as the related taking of possession, copying and examination of documents. Subject to specific restrictions, criminal intelligence methods could also be used in premises used for permanent residence.  Independently of the amendments to the Constitution, the draft proposal currently being circulated for comments would also add methods concerning the collection of location data and the use of participatory covert human intelligence sources to the threat-informed criminal intelligence toolkit. 

The Helsinki District Court would decide centrally on the use of the methods that most strongly interfere with the protection of privacy, such as on-site interception, technical observation, technical tracking of a person and the use of telecommunications data collection methods. 

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation would decide on undercover activities, pseudo purchases and the use of participatory covert human intelligence sources, but the court would decide whether the conditions for use exist. 

The decision to launch threat-informed criminal intelligence could also be made by a commanding police officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who is familiar with criminal intelligence.

At the commanding officer level, decisions could be made on methods such as extended surveillance; technical observation, on-site interception or site exploitation in premises other than those covered by the right to domestic privacy; undercover activities carried out in an information network; and covert intelligence collection, as well as the related taking of possession, copying and examination of documents linked to site exploitation.

In an emergency, a decision could also be made at command level on specific methods that fall within the court’s decision-making authority until the court has granted authorisation. 

External legality oversight of criminal intelligence would be carried out by the Intelligence Ombudsman in addition to supreme overseers of legality. 

The National Bureau of Investigation would have to keep the Intelligence Ombudsman informed of the decisions and use of criminal intelligence methods.

The Intelligence Ombudsman has wide-ranging rights to access information and powers to carry out oversight of legality. 

This oversight would safeguard the legal protection of persons targeted by criminal intelligence. 

Oversight of criminal intelligence collection in the administrative branch of the Ministry of the Interior would be the responsibility of the National Police Board and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. The Ministry of the Interior would have to submit an annual report to the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Intelligence Ombudsman on the use and oversight of criminal intelligence methods and their protection.

The police would be able to use information obtained through criminal intelligence methods to combat threats of serious crime, prevent crime and target police action.

The use of information obtained through criminal intelligence methods to solve an offence, for example as evidence in a criminal case, would be significantly restricted for reasons of legal protection.

Information obtained through criminal intelligence methods could also be used as evidence in support of innocence and, among other things, to prevent a significant risk to life, health or freedom. Information obtained through criminal intelligence methods could, under certain conditions, also be disclosed to other public authorities.  

Civilian intelligence focuses on intelligence of threats to national security and on informing the highest levels of government, with no direct link to crime and criminal acts.

The police are the general public authority for internal security and are primarily responsible for the prevention and operational response to serious crime and threats of serious crime.

Criminal intelligence provides information to support decision-making in the fight against crime and in combating the threats posed by crime. 

Threats to national security can also manifest themselves in society in the form of crime. In these situations, the importance of cooperation, exchange of information and operational coordination between public authorities is underlined.

According to the Government Programme, the Government will assess the need to specify the Constitution to enable the effective gathering of criminal intelligence. 

Section 10 of the Constitution, concerning the protection of private life, was reviewed under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice.

The amendments proposed to the Constitution aim, among other things, to step up the fight against serious crime.

The first legislative proposal on criminal intelligence, which is to be submitted to Parliament as soon as possible, sets out those provisions on threat-informed criminal intelligence that are considered possible within the framework of the current Constitution.

In the second phase of the criminal intelligence project, amendments has been prepared which, if implemented, would require changes to the limitation clauses of section 10 of the Constitution concerning the protection of confidential communications and domestic privacy. The draft proposal for the second phase is being circulated for comments from 8 June to 3 August 2026 and is to be submitted to Parliament as soon as possible thereafter, in early autumn.  

More information about the Ministry of Justice project: https://oikeusministerio.fi/hanke?tunnus=OM067:00/2024: https://oikeusministerio.fi/hanke?tunnus=OM067:00/2024 and https://www.eduskunta.fi/valtiopaivaasiat/HE+50/2026 (in Finnish)

With automated web crawlers, i.e. automated intelligence collection systems, the police would be able to collect intelligence about groups operating online whose purpose is criminal activity such as drug trafficking or sexual abuse of children.